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REASSEMBLING THE LEGAL
'The Wonders of Modern Science' in Court-Related Proceedings
Richard Mohr and Francesco Contini

The article analyses the ways in which technology and law
disperse, channel and reassemble agency in ICT-enabled legal
proceedings. It works from case studies of online civil claims in
England and Italy, and the automatically issued speed camera
fine process in Australia. Information and communication
technologies affect legal procedures in three dimensions:
legitimacy, efficacy and performativity. The law can legitimate
ensembles of technological and performative procedures, but it
cannot construct them by regulation. Technology is a distinct
regulative regime that opens some channels of communication
while closing others. Machines and software codes identify and
admit participants and direct human activity. The focus on the
performative explores the requirements of sense-making, by
which participants recognise the context and the legal
consequences of ICT-enabled procedures. The interfaces of
law and technology rely on the interpretive context in which
messages are understood as well as the legal forms in which
they are transmitted. Each of these elements is essential to the
circulation of agency between people and things that
reassembles and constitutes legal and social relationships.

Focus: Technology and the Performance of Law
Law, Technology and Courts
Law has always worked with technology, even if it was not called by that
name. If we think of technology as those things that people use to achieve a
desired effect,' then the technology of law has encompassed documents,
Richard Mohr is Director of Social Research, Policy and Planning Pty Ltd, Australia
(srpp.com.au). Francesco Contini is a researcher at the Research Institute on Judicial
Systems (IRSIG-CNR) in Bologna, Italy. While this article is the result of a joint effort of
the two authors, the evaluation exercise of the Italian research systems requires the
attribution of specific sections to individual authors. In response to this evaluation
requirement, individual sections may be attributed as follows. Mohr: Performing the legal;
Approach to the research; Speed cameras; Making technology legal; Pathways and the
reassembling of agency; Contexts of the performative. Contini: Law, technology and
courts; Regulation of technology and technology as regulative regime; Money Claim
Online; Trial Online; Identity and agency.
Latour (2005) considers this and other relations between people and technology in his
Reassembling the Social, to which our title alludes. Our subtitle quotes Justice Hayne
from the transcript of video linked proceedings before the High Court in an urgent hearing
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signatures and files.2 The courtroom is a technology of the law, providing a
place for the parties and the judge to come together and communicate, for
witnesses to be sworn and to give evidence, and for judges to pronounce
binding decisions. The bench, with its raised position, facilitates the judge's
surveillance and control of the court, as well as framing (below the insignia
of a coat of arms or other symbol of authority) the legal pronouncement of a
sentence or interlocutory orders.' This well-known ensemble of people in
specific roles, and things that set the scene of their roles and record the
statements they make, has accompanied and developed with the law over
many centuries.' Some of the interactions between the law, people and things
have been written into procedural law and court rules while others, gradually
established by convention and habitus, remain unwritten.
Over the past 20 years, information and communication technology
(ICT) has burst into this peaceful scene. The dominant role of oral
communication and paper records has increasingly been supplemented,
usurped or duplicated by computerised functions. This process has usually
been promoted by enthusiastic bureaucrats, and implemented by software
companies and hardware sales reps, while often being resisted by reluctant
judges. Visions of 'courts of the future' and 'paperless courts' have been
held up as a utopia for technology and law to enter, hand in hand.'
Borrowing terms from ICT, these courts would be user-friendly, open 24/7,
with data entered and available in real time. The new bureaucratic
specialisations of quality assurance and new public management announced
that these science fiction courts would be efficient, accessible and timely.'
Even if the courts still use paper, and the future is yet to come, a
growing number of tasks previously accomplished by humans working with
paper have been delegated to or inscribed onto machines. One of the
outcomes is that 'judicial and legal procedures, together with the agencies
that come with them, are inscribed, although not entirely, into technical
procedures and objects'.' The effort has not been just technological but also
legal and regulatory, since the placement of technologies into highly
regulated court environments has required new sets of formal rules. Indeed,

2

4

of an application to prevent the deportation of asylum seekers from Australia to Malaysia,
in which the Commonwealth Solicitor-General, in Canberra, was delayed in sending a
crucial affidavit to the plaintiffs in Melbourne. When it was received by counsel in
Melbourne, 'electronically, unswom, and no exhibits', Justice Hayne responded, with
irony: 'The wonders of modem science. What are we going to do, Mr Solicitor?' See Shah
& Ors v Minister for Immigration and Citienship & Anor [20111 HCA Transcript 196
(8 August 2011), www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/HCATrans/201 1/196.htmi.
Vismann (2008).
Mohr (2000).
Garapon (1995); Jacob (1995-96).
Abdulaziz and Druke (2003); Nicholson (2002).
Contini and Mohr (2007); Contini and Mohr (2008).
Lanzara (2009), p 13.
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court technology too must be regulated, regularised or legitimised to allow
its operations within the legal domain of the courts.
The rapid introduction of ICT, the degree of formality of its software
codes, and its relative distance from the courts (through out-sourcing and
other forms of public-private partnerships) have all highlighted the degree of
competition and potential conflict between the laws of technology and the
technology of law. In our contribution to the themes of this issue, we
consider the interactions between the legal frameworks that regulate the
technologies used by the courts and the codes that specify how the
technology is to be operated. As will be seen, this interaction is unstable and
liable to lead to unanticipated consequences.
We begin, in the following two sub-sections, by introducing the key
concepts of our inquiry: regulation and performativity. First we consider the
different ways in which law and technology regulate human agency. Then
we identify certain essential functions that must be performed in constituting
and implementing a legal order. This study focuses on the identification of
parties and on the legal, public and lasting changes of status required in
court-related proceedings.
Having established the conceptual tools of our analysis, we introduce
three case studies. Two involve money claims, where parties establish
whether they owe or are owed money. The third involves traffic
infringements, where cameras have identified a speeding vehicle, and the
responsible driver must then be brought to justice. The case studies involve
various technological processes, and range across the jurisdictions of
England and Wales, Italy and of certain Australian states and territories.
In the third and final part of the article, we draw a number of
conclusions about the relations between law, technology and the people who
use them. None of these elements works in isolation. Instead, we understand
them as shifting assemblages that bring together rules, objects and actors to
carry out particular functions. This perspective clarifies the roles of law as a
legitimating device, of technology as enabling functions and of people as
actors who need to know the implications and consequences of their
performances. Our conclusions,address both principles and practices.

Regulation of Technology and Technology as Regulative Regime
Technology entered into the courts and into the public sector also with the
aim of reducing bureaucratisation.' The effect, however, has been quite
different. Technology brings into play a new, thick layer of regulations,'
which may be clearly seen in the fields we are considering. Technical norms
proliferate in order to specify how technological artefacts must (or are
supposed to) operate. They are particularly visible from a system
development perspective, since at this level rules (and behaviours) have to
be inscribed into the machine. Technology regulation can be considered as 'a
8

9

Cordella and Willcocks (2009); Velicogna (2008).
Lessig (2007).
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particular mode of institutionalisation' through which norms are inscribed
'onto tangible technical installations and apparatus'." In this way, action is
directly delegated to the machines that do (or that automate) what humans
were doing. Just as procedural norms are part of the institutional structure of
any judicial system, 'technical norms are the institutional structure of
machinery'."
In the courts landscape, we can observe rules prescribing which
technology can be used to perform specific functions (such as proof of
identity); norms indicating the technical features of the technology (such as
the protocols to be used to secure data interchanges); norms indicating
machine behaviour ('the printer must use A4 pages', 'data are exchanged
through an HTTPS protocol')" and also norms indicating how one must
behave vis-a-vis a machine (such as to log in before being enabled to do a
particular operation). The first obvious consequence is that instead of
reducing bureaucracy and regulation, the massive deployment of ICT often
requires a massive deployment of regulation.
From another angle, the machine (technically regulated) guides or even
dictates human behaviour, as with speed bumps regulating traffic" or webbased home banking or e-justice procedures. Some technological
applications are self-enforcing, since if humans do not entirely and precisely
follow the instructions provided by the system, the whole procedure is
stopped or, as in the case of speed bumps, undesirable consequences follow.
Technology therefore has its own 'normativity' - that is, the capacity to
'actually constrain human actions, inviting or enforcing, inhibiting or
prohibiting types of behaviour'." It can direct human behaviour by means of
an 'invisible hand', often made of software codes, in a much more
compelling manner than can traditional regulation.
The power of technology to regulate such a range of activities has led
Kallinikos to argue that technology may be seen as 'a major regulative
regime', which he defines as:
a technical, social and institutional system of forces that shape human
agency both in the direct way of embodying functionalities that
engrave particular courses of action and in the rather unobtrusive
fashion of shaping perceptions and preferences, forming skills and
professional rules.
10

14

Czarniawska and Joerges (1998), p 372.
Czarniawska and Joerges (1998), p 378.
Each of these regulations is linked to other regulations and standards developed in various
technological sectors, such as the A4 page (International Standard ISO 216) or the https
protocol (combining http and ssl technical standards).
Latour (1999), p 186.
Hildebrandt (2008), p 5.

15

Lessig (2007).

16

Kallinikos (2009a), p 70.

1
12

'
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From this perspective, formal laws (including procedural codes) and
technology (together with its own codes and regulating impulses) constitute
different regulative regimes. Both engage 'normativity', but they constitute
distinct modes of regulation, and operate in different ways."
Technology is outcome oriented: it works - which is to say that it
produces the expected outcomes - or it does not work." It is judged
teleologically. A given e-filing application is good from a technological
point of view if it allows users to send online files to the court. But the
effective electronic delivery of such files may not be sufficient to constitute
a valid filing of the case from a legal perspective. Formal regulations are
judged deontologically: they separate the legal from the illegal. What works
from a technological perspective is not necessarily legal. A case may be filed
via an online system approved by the court and not by other means; identity
may be ascertained online by using a given technology (such as a security
protocol), but not using any other, and so on. In many courts, it is not
possible to file a case by using regular email. Legal changes can outlaw
technology even though it may have been used effectively for some time.
When a new privacy law entered into force in Italy in 2003, the courts' web
services providing case-related information, including names of individuals
and companies involved, suddenly became illegal." Therefore, even when
the information provided by such web services was in high demand, they
were nonetheless shut down. 20 At the same time there are many technologies
that are legal, since some authority endorsed their use, but are failures from a
technological point of view, since they do not produce the expected
outcomes - or, simply speaking, do not work. 2' Any legal process, whatever
technologies it uses, must be judged both teleologically, for its effect, and
deontologically, for its legitimacy. Kelsen said as much.2 2 In the following
section, and in conclusion, we draw on linguistic and semiotic approaches to
examine the nexus between the technical and legal systems and their
operation in a social and institutional context.

Performing the Legal
The following case studies have been selected for the light they can cast on
the interaction of intersecting regulative regimes. We analyse the
entanglements between technology and formal rules in the operations of
online civil claims and automatically generated traffic infringements. Our
focus is narrowed further in terms of the functions of courts and related legal
processes. Courts resolve disputes, provide a forum for testing legal issues of
public interest, pronounce decisions favouring one party or another, and
17

18
19

20
21
22

Hildebrandt (2008).
Weick (1990), pp 3-5.
DL n. 196/2003.
Velicogna and Ng (2006).
Fabri (2008).
Kelsen (1967), pp 211-12.
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determine penalties - all of which must be verified and recorded. To
maintain a clear direction for this research, we must clarify which of these
myriad functions are to be analysed. Even in the relatively simple
transactions that we have chosen, the law and the technology interact in
carrying out numerous functions: inputting data, generating process,
communicating with respondents, identifying parties, recording and
communicating judgments or outcomes, acknowledging receipt, and so on.
Any of these processes could be studied using various methods: user
surveys, phenomenological studies or minute descriptions of procedure and
computer functions. Here we turn to aspects of linguistic theory for help.
Law iterates and reiterates a legal order.2 3 The legal order may be seen
as a key guarantee of the social order, and indeed unless law is to be a
formalistic end in itself, it must serve such broader social ends. A key
element of law's iteration of the legal order is to manage and record the
status of people, including the legal obligations between them and their
relationships to certain material assets.24 Law does not only record, but also
confers changes of status. One cannot make a transition from single to
married, from free to detained, from debtor to bankrupt, unless the proper
legal forms are followed.25
Legal processes and the utterances that constitute them are made up of
performatives, intended to institute specific changes to the social order and
to re-establish relations between citizens within a legal order. All courts and
other binding legal procedures must have the capacity to pronounce these
decisions in a legitimate and effective way. Even before arriving at the final
decision, law and the courts deal with performative utterances in numerous
ways. These include undertakings made by the parties, either in court
proceedings or in antecedent contractual or administrative arrangements,
statements made under oath, and the oath itself.26
These performative utterances are essential to the operation of law, and
they must be carried out in new, electronic forms as well as in the traditional
legal setting. So the focus of our analysis is on the forms and conditions of
successful performatives found in our case studies, for comparison with the
baseline conditions found in the face-to-face and paper-based forms found in
traditional courts.
Successful performatives underlie each of the many functions of courts
and their electronic counterparts. For the purposes of this study, we limit our
focus to specific crucial moments, or functions, which are fundamental to
any proceedings: identifying the parties and recording their statements and
23
24

25
26

Butler (1997), pp 33-40.
As seen in more detail below, legal pronouncements underpin 'the force of law" that
supports human societies, [through] linguistic enunciations that stably obligate living
beings': Agamben (2011), p 70.
Austin (1980); Benveniste (1966), p 269.
The expression 'oath' here covers both the religious form of swearing by God, and the
secular form, generally called the 'affirmation' in Australia. The legal effect is equivalent.
Statements made under oath are admitted to the legal realm.
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legally relevant acts, including outcomes leading to changes of legal status.
We consider these functions before returning to a more detailed discussion
of our approach to the performative mechanisms by which they are achieved.
The proper identification of parties and any related actors is crucial to
the performative work of the law." Latour found the identification of the
9nonciateur,the author of the statement, to be central to the operations of the
senior French administrative court, the Conseil d'dtat. 'The whole of law can
be grasped as an obsessional effort to make the enunciation assignable
(rendre I'inonciationassignable).' The parties must be known, the author of
the statement acknowledged. Latour identified 'the signature, the archive,
the text, the file' as 'the perilous tracks' by which the law seeks to reattach
the statements to their speakers ('les inoncis a leurs nonciateurs)."
We are not dealing with a court as lofty as the Conseil d'dtat, but with
prosaic mechanisms for claiming money and issuing speeding fines. Yet the
same 'obsessional efforts' must be made: the parties must be identified; their
statements must be assignable; their oath must be binding. They must be
recognised for who they are, what they have said and what their obligations
are. The tracks must be preserved so there is a record for future reference
and for publicity.
Identification in legal proceedings is usually achieved by performative,
not descriptive means. A descriptive statement is judged by its veracity that is, its correspondence with some independent state of affairs - so that it
is an accurate representation. Courts and other legal processes normally
spend little effort in empirically discovering the identity of a party. In most
proceedings, it is enough that I sign my name (perhaps before a witness or a
justice of the peace), or swear my name and address under oath. I declare my
identity and I am recognised. Forensic proceedings may seek to identify
bodies unable to swear or suspects unwilling to admit their identity, but
these are of little relevance in the proceedings considered here (or even in
the Conseil d'itat). In most legal proceedings, we are identified by our oath
or signature: performative events that are definitive in the legal world,
creatingor institutinga state of affairs by being uttered.
Successful performatives, including both the undertakings of parties
and the decisions of the court, rely on written and oral language. Austin's
theory of the performative showed that language did not simply
communicate information, but effected transitions in social relations.2 9 These
can only be instituted by invoking the power of the performative, which
relies on certain conditions for this efficacy. These include:

27

2

29

Recognising the parties for who they are is not simply a formal legal requirement, but
goes to the heart of political and moral life. Honneth (1995) and Ricoeur (2004) have
placed the relationship of recognition at the very foundation of the polity and of social life
respectively. Here we focus simply on its role in legal proceedings.
Latour (2002), pp 295, 297.
Austin (1980).
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*

a reference to memory or records, so that the performative is on the
public record (orally, in writing, or by means of some material
marker)30
*
a unique yet repeatable formula, which relies on both words and
context."
The context includes the material setting of the utterance as well as the
institutional context within which it is performed. The material setting may
include certain actions that must accompany the words or particular
architectures within which it is set.32 The broader institutional context
involves the legal and cultural actions that authorise the setting and the
various actors within it. The introduction of ICT into courts changes both the
material and institutional settings of judicial proceedings.
Once the entire context - social, spatial and temporal - is admitted to
the proactive landscape of the affirmation of the social (and not just legal)
order, then new actors are recognised: not just the judge, but all the
interlocutors; not just the bench, but all the furniture, equipment and
architecture that frames and authorises the enunciation; not just the
signature, but the bodily gesture that enacts it, and the context in which the
commitment is made.
In summary, our study examines the role of performative utterances in
identification and status change to bind the telos of technology to the deon of
law. Legal discourse has consequences. To make admissions, to accept
responsibility, to blame or to deny culpability are all means by which we and
our actions are recognised. There must be records of those transactions (now
rarely oral, usually written, increasingly digital) if their effects are to be
lasting and not simply ephemeral. The law courts have long managed those
processes of performance, enunciation and recording. As we come to
recognise the fuller social context of the courts and related procedures, it is
no longer possible to isolate their discourse within the exclusive 'system' of
law and legal formalism. The collective assemblages" that confer authority
and recognition include the various files, databases and communication
channels through which the parties interact and in which their statements including oaths, commitments, admissions and denials - are recorded.
A number of questions flow from this focus. How is performative
efficacy maintained in, or changed by, a radically different physical and
informational architecture? How do the components of oath, identity and
recording respond to the different technological environments? How are
gestures, words, signatures and evidence reassembled by digital technologies
outside the rigid traditional setting of the courtroom?
30

Vismann (2008).

31

Foucault (2002), p 31; Derrida (1988), p 18.
Austin (1980), p 8 .

32
3

Giovan Francesco Lanzara has helpfully pointed out, in commenting on earlier versions of
this work, that 'assemblage' in this context is more closely related to the French
agencement', a richer and more precise term that refers to the social circulation of
agency, in space and time, through persons and objects, than the French 'assemblage'.
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Identification and Status Change in Three ICT-Enabled Legal
Processes
Approach to the Research
While keeping the conventional courtroom and associated judicial
proceedings as the baseline point of reference, we will extend our discussion
with three diverse examples illustrating different approaches using ICT to
enable identification and management of changes of status: Money Claim
Online, handling small claims in England and Wales, Civil Trial Online
(Processo Civile Telematico), an ambitious project developed by the Italian
Ministry of Justice to digitise the entire civil procedure, and the ubiquitous
speed cameras associated with automatic infringement notices, specifically
those used certain Australian jurisdictions. Such diverse sources can offer a
robust field within which to examine the role of different technologies, the
interplay between law and technology, and how the new technologymediated context affects performative utterances.
There are strict limitations on who may be admitted to judicial or other
legal proceedings. One must have standing, a recognised role in the process.
In the simple matters we are considering - small claims and speeding fines this involves no great legal disputes, but it must begin with the identification
of the parties. This must be ascertained in a formally appropriate manner. In
conventional legal practices, identity is ascertained with a set of wellestablished practices endorsed by formal regulations, such as a signature on
a document, or certain statements under oath.
The question of online legal identity, on the other hand, is still
problematic. Indeed, while many technologies can provide more or less
robust technical solutions, such solutions are not necessarily acceptable from
a legal point of view. Electronic identity cards are not widely used. Simple
systems based on user names and passwords, accepted in so many areas of
online transactions, are not accepted by either of the money claim systems
we consider (though one is much simpler than the other). The question of
digital identity remains a quintessential case of the difficult mediations
between technology and the law. Speed cameras, and the procedures they
use to fine those who have exceeded the speed limits, involve different
issues of identification. These are both technological (whether the picture is
clear enough to read the licence plate) and legal (how to identify the driver).
Identification is just the first step to performing changes of status.
Indeed, any institution charged with legal changes of status must go through
a number of necessary steps, while the detail varies between the instances
we are considering. Once the parties have been identified and admitted into
the proceedings, the institution needs to gather information on claims,
liability and any areas of agreement or disagreement between the parties.
Since the institution does not carry out its own fact-finding (beyond
verifying that the parties are who they say they are), this information must be
provided by the parties. Once the information is coded, as noted above, into
a form that is able to be stored and utilised by the institution, it forms the
basis of a decision-making process that follows rules to reach a public
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pronouncement. That is to be announced in a prescribed form so that all
interested parties are aware of it, while being recorded in a permanent form
for future legal reference to the party's status or obligations. This section
discusses each of these issues for the three cases we are considering.

Money Claim Online (England and Wales)
Money Claim Online (MCOL) is a web-based service for issuing money
claims and resolving fixed money disputes introduced by the Department of
Constitutional Affairs (DCA) of England and Wales since 2002. Following
the findings and criticisms of Lord Woolf's report on civil justice," the goal
was to improve access to justice by opening new 'modern' channels for
dispute-resolution and reducing the cost of money claims." The system was
rapidly developed and deployed, taking advantage of pre-existing
technological components, to the extent that it became the largest 'English
court' in terms of number of users and cases handled. One of the reasons for
its great success is the way in which it has solved the question of users'
identification. During the development of MCOL, the first idea was to
identify users through the 'Government Gateway', a common point of entry
to e-government services. But since the Gateway was not yet fully
functional," the DCA preferred to use a ready-made component provided by
a private company, integrated with a payment system engine based on credit
and debit cards."
To enrol into MCOL, the plaintiff has to provide personal data and
specify a customer ID and input a password into the MCOL website
(developed and run by a private company). Once logged into MCOL, the
'customer' can file a new case. This is done by filling out some web forms
made available by the system to provide a description of the claim and to
state the sum of money owed. At the end of this procedure, plaintiffs first
write their name to sign the 'statement of truth', and then pay the court fees
with their own debit or credit card. The name provided during the customer
enrolment and used to sign the statement of truth must correspond to the
name of the owner of the card used to pay the court fee. The analogy
between this procedure and those commonly used in e-commerce is
apparent. The citizen's identity is established digitally as their 'customer
ID', and the typing of one's name substitutes for the handwritten signature.
The claim is then processed by a centralised unit (County Court Bulk Centre
under the supervision of the Northampton County Court) and sent
electronically to a printing and posting facility (also provided by a private
company). This unit prints the claim, prepares the 'claim pack' and sends it
to the defendant by regular mail. The defendant, having received the claim
14
15

16

37

Woolf(1996).
Timms et al (2003).
MCOL switched to the Government Gateway in 2010, eight years after the launch of the
system.
Kallinikos (2009b).
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pack, may choose from several possible responses: ignore it, pay the amount
claimed, acknowledge the service, make an admission (partial or full) or file
a counter-claim. The defendant's replies can be managed online using
MCOL, since the user name and password of the defendant are generated by
the system and printed on the front of the claim form. But the defendant can
also use the paper forms (provided with the claim pack) and send them to the
Bulk Centre through the post." In this latter case, MCOL staff enter the data
into the system. Therefore the procedure selected by the defendant can be
either online or offline. The Bulk Centre processes the reply that is then sent
to the plaintiff. The procedure varies, depending on the type of reply made
by the defendant. It can be handled by the MCOL system up to the judgment
order or warrant of execution, except in case of a defence or counter-claim.
In that case, it is sent directly to the court with the proper territorial
jurisdiction, since a disputed claim requires the intervention of ajudge.
The approach of the DCA has been designed to increase users' access
to justice by taking advantage of technologies already deployed by the courts
(like the Bulk Centre systems) and those familiar to potential users (like
debit and credit card payment). This allowed the use of the same standard
components already adopted for e-commerce to allow identification, and
hence access to MCOL, to all English and Welsh 'consumers' owning a
credit or debit card.
Once the system had been developed and tested, the DCA mandated the
legality of filing and handling a well-defined set of civil suits. This was done
through Practice Direction 7E which regulates the terms of use and the
procedure to be followed when using the system, but not its technical
features. Article 1.1 states that:
This practice direction provides for a scheme in which, in the
circumstances set out in this practice direction, a request for a claim
form to be issued and other specified documents may be filed
electronically. ('Money Claim Online')
Article 1.2 simply enables claimants 'to start certain types of County
Court claims by requesting the issue of a claim form electronically via Her
Majesty's Courts Service website' without even specifying the basic features
of that site. Finally, Article 10 states that: 'Any provision of the Civil
procedure rules which requires a document to be signed by any person is
satisfied by that person entering their name on an online form.' This reduces
to a minimum the functional and technical requirements of the signature.

Trial Online (Italy)
Trial Online (TOL) is an ambitious project launched in 2000 by the Italian
Ministry of Justice to fully digitise all civil proceedings and achieve a
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paperless court." The development of TOL was driven first by formal rules,
approved several years before the first running applications."
Italian rules determined that the digital signature, based on EU
regulation, was the only technology capable of properly identifying users
and signing documents, and ensuring security and non-repudiation of
communications. The Ministry of Justice, acting as rule maker and system
developer, mandated a public key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signature
for all procedures requiring identification and signature. These means were
assumed to be the keys to reaching a paperless utopia that would bring with
it huge increases in timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of judicial
proceedings. Less demanding technological solutions, such as those adopted
for MCOL or in other e-justice applications, were not considered to be
sufficient to meet the legal requirements of security, confidentiality and nonrepudiation." This led to the need to develop a large number of hardware and
software components from scratch for both courts and lawyers. As a
consequence, the development phase was long and expensive. It was only
after six years, at the end of 2006, that the court of Milan became the first in
Italy to begin using the system, and then only for money claims and not for
any other procedures.
As distinct from MCOL, pro se litigation is generally not admitted in
the Italian case, therefore only lawyers can file a case in court." For Italian
lawyers to file a case electronically, they must first buy a smart card with
digital signature usually provided by their local lawyers' association. Only
then may they connect to the systems of the Ministry of Justice and of the
courts. To file a money claim, the plaintiff lawyer must scan the mandate of
the client, any evidence (such as contracts and invoices) and the proof that
the court fee has been paid at a post office. Then the lawyer must draft the
petition using a specific software application developed by private
companies. The application requires data to be entered in structured forms,
to create a standardised digital document. Everything is signed with the
lawyer's digital signature, and attached together inside a digital envelope.
Only at this stage can the lawyer, using the smart card, connect to the access
point provided by the lawyers' association, and send the application and
attachments to the court system via the central system of the Ministry of
Justice.4 3 Having received this digital package, the court registry prints the
plaintiffs application to create a paper case file for the archive. At the same
time, the judge, using ad hoc software, analyses the case, prepares and
9
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Carnevali (2010), p 124.
Law no. 59 of 1997 established the legal value of digital documents and digital signature
based on PKI standard (L n 59/1997), and the Presidential Decree no 123 of 2001
endorsed Trial Online based on that law (DPR n 123/2001).
Fabri (2009).
The only exception to this rule is for cases up to 500 Euros dealt with by a Justice of the
Peace.
Ministero della Giustizia, 'Processo Civile Telematico',
www.processotelematico.giustizia.it.
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digitally signs the order, and sends it to the registry of the court. The registry
prints the order, which is then placed in the case file and made available to
the plaintiff, who may check the order and go to the court to get a paper
copy of it. At this stage, the plaintiffs lawyer can serve the order on the
defendant using the services provided by the bailiffs' office. The defendant,
having received the money claim, can pay the sum or appoint a defence
lawyer. Any defence is filed in the traditional paper-based way.
As noted, TOL was developed starting from formal rules. In contrast to
MCOL, the Italian authorities attempted to regulate the technical features of
the software and hardware application with 'technical rules'. After the
publication of the framework regulation," the Ministry of Justice had to
approve an incredible number of technical regulations defining, from a legal
perspective, every single detail of the technological components. The system
development had to follow the specification of the formal regulation enacted
to clarify the features of the applications, how the technology was to operate,
and how users were to act vis-a-vis the technological applications."
It took almost three years just to draft and enact the regulations required
to develop the systems of the Ministry of Justice and of the courts.46 Then it
was necessary to draft technical regulations for the applications to be
developed by the lawyers' associations, since nothing had yet been
developed in this second area (also due to the lack of technical
specification). Digital signature was the EU legal standard, and represented
the best possible option from a legal point of view. The attempt at regulating
ex ante the technological apparatus was a way to reaffirm the full control of
the legislator, of the Ministry of Justice and of the judges over the technical
features of the tools. But what was simple and rational from a purely legal
perspective has been almost impossible to develop from a technological
perspective.

Speed Cameras (Australia)
In Australian jurisdictions, cameras photograph the registration plates of
vehicles exceeding the speed limit and going through red lights. We deal
here with 'speed cameras', which are intended to reduce road accidents by
discouraging drivers from speeding. The rationale for and locations of speed
cameras are controversial, being widely regarded as revenue-raising devices
rather than road safety measures."
Speed cameras consist of movement-detection devices embedded in the
road surface, linked to speed measurement technology and cameras that
photograph the registration number plate of any vehicle exceeding the speed

4
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D.P.R. n. 123/2001.
Fabri (2009), p 130.
Decree of the Ministry of Justice n. 264 of 2000, Ministerial decree of 27 March 2000
(D.M. n. 264/2000), followed by other regulations.
Auditor-General (NSW) (2011).
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limit in the location of the movement sensor." The images are stored
electronically on a 'Write Once Read Many' (WORM) disk and a security
indicator is produced simultaneously, which records any attempt to alter the
image or associated data. Each electronic transfer of the image and
associated data (such as time, date and location) is encrypted. The person
named on the penalty notice may view the image online or purchase a copy
of it. Those images are 'office copies' only, and cannot be relied on as
evidence, while the original images may be tendered in any court
proceedings together with expert evidentiary certificates."
The image captured at the time of the offence shows the vehicle and its
registration number, while authorities point out that it does not record a
photo of the driver. The number is linked to the state's record of registered
vehicles and their owners. A notice is sent to the registered owner at their
postal address giving the place, time and date of the recording of the offence
and the speed recorded. The registered number of the vehicle is given,
together with the penalty payable and the demerit points incurred.so This
notice has the appearance and (up to a point) the function of an invoice or
bill requiring money to be paid.
The owner must respond within 28 days by doing one of five things:
pay the penalty, request more time to pay, dispute liability (or ask for an
extension of time to dispute liability) or complete a statutory declaration.
These options are followed by five 'payment options', to which we return in
the following section. Here we note that the camera has naturally identified a
48
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In the ACT, approved devices are listed in the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic
Management) Regulation 2000 (ACT), s 102, with approved testing authorities at s 103. In
New South Wales, approved devices for measuring speed and recording images are
defined as those devices approved by the Govemor (for measuring speed) or other
approval authority (in the case of cameras) and listed in the New South Wales
Government Gazette (Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (NSW),
ss 44-45). Devices are typically described in these regulations and Gazettes by brand and
model - for example, 'Laser Technology Inc. LTI 20-20 Marksman' (Road Transport
(Safety and Traffic Management) Regulation 2000 (ACT), s 102). The use of delegated
legislation enables the relevant government authorities to add new devices easily. In New
South Wales, testing of the devices is to be carried out in accordance with Australian
Standard AS 2898.1-2003, Radar Speed Detection - Functional Requirements and
Definitions (Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Regulation 1999 (NSW), s
156).
Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Regulation 2000 (ACT), s 103; NSW
Roads and Traffic Authority, 'Speeding',
www.rta.nsw.gov.au/roadsafety/speedandspeedcameras; State Debt Recovery Office,
'Camera Detected Speeding Offences',
www.sdro.nsw.gov.aullib/docs/forms/sfs-cdpn.pdf.
The following data were obtained from original research inadvertently carried out by one
of the authors between 12:02:12 pm on 13 July 2010 and 19 August 2010. The
infringement was committed in the jurisdiction of the ACT, while the vehicle was
registered in the state of New South Wales (to a person other than the driver). The driver
was licensed in that state, and demerit points were transferred to that jurisdiction.
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vehicle, but the notice is sent to a person. The fine print following the
'Complete a Statutory Declaration' option states:
(You must complete a declaration if you were not the driver at the
time of the offence or the infringement notice is served on a
corporation.) IMPORTANT - Do not send payment with declaration.
A new infringement notice will be served on the driver of the vehicle.
The onus is thus on the owner to identify the driver." The statutory
declaration form that is sent with the infringement notice requires the owner
to state whether the vehicle was stolen, sold or driven by a 'known user',
giving that person's name, address, date of birth and licence number. This
elaborate exercise in identification of a person, after the technology has
identified the vehicle using a camera and a database, relies on a different set
of inputs and techniques: the memory of the owner, their relationship with
and knowledge of the driver, and their honesty. Penalties for dishonesty are
severe, as was seen in the celebrated case of the former judge Marcus
Einfeld, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for falsely
identifying a deceased person as the driver of his car in order to avoid a
AU$77 speeding fine."
Payment of the fine constitutes admission of the offence, so that once
the payment is made, the identity or liability of the owner may no longer be
disputed. This is the reason for the importance attached to not sending
payment with a statutory declaration. The technology readily recognises the
motor vehicle and its registration number. The need to identify a person and
issue process to the offender is a mark of the law. Despite the fact that the
notice looks much like any other bill, and the major impact of the
infringement is the payment of a fine, this is not to be treated like any other
debt incurred. It must not be paid (even by the driver) until the law has
named and blamed them. The practical consequence is that the demerit
points must be deducted from the record of the correct licensed driver. If the
owner, or driver, pays the fine before the infringement is issued to the driver,
then the owner incurs the loss of points. Compare the payment of motorway
tolls: the vehicle incurs the cost, and the authority collecting the toll money
cares only that the payment is received. Like an electricity bill, there is no
issue about who pays. In the case of camera-detected offences, though, even
though the motor vehicle is likewise the object by which the obligation is
incurred, and the offender is identified and processed, the law insists that this
process be slowed down, that the offender be called before the law.

Conclusions: Legalise, Reassemble, Signify
The three case studies exhibit many differences: they are taken from
countries with different legal traditions and they have been developed to
pursue different goals. But there are also some similarities that make for
51
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useful comparisons. To conclude, we now draw out a number of principles
and practical implications for reassembling the legal, technological and
social in legal proceedings. These fall under four main headings:
*
First, we consider the ways law and technology may work together in
valid and effective identification of parties. This introduces general
issues regarding the interaction between people, rules and things.
Excessive legal regulation magnifies complexity, while simplicity
needs to be complemented with adequate markers of the legality of the
proceedings.
*
Second, we see that interactions between law and technology need to
be developed together. We point to the dangers of trying to design
technology using legal rules. Law can legitimise processes, but it
cannot construct machines. Law needs to comprehend new
assemblages of actors and objects, rather than trying to regulate every
tool or keystroke.
*
Third, we point out that processes rarely stay on one technological
track: instead, they switch between electronic, paper and oral modes of
communication. Each of these domains regulates activities in its own
way, through its own gatekeepers and agents. As the technology and
the actors proliferate so too does complexity and risk.
*
Finally, we step outside the close law-technology coupling to consider
their broader social context. Diverse technologies, familiar from
different aspects of daily life, come with various assumed meaning
frameworks. Performativity relies on context both for its efficacy and
its comprehension. We consider the difficulties that may arise when
legal summonses look like bills, and oaths look like passwords.

Identity and Agency
It has been seen that the question of digital identity is one of the most
complicated issues to be dealt with in the three case studies. Looking behind
the very different flow of actions and procedures, and the specific
technology involved in establishing identity, we see several similarities. All
the systems of digital identification are based on common elements: a piece
of hardware (TOL's smart card, MCOL's debit or credit card and the car
number plate for the speed cameras), associated with some digital records.
To allow digital identification, some paper-based procedure must be
followed. A contract must be signed to buy a smart card; application forms
lodged with a bank to issue a credit card; registration forms for a motor
vehicle. In the three systems considered, a computerised system
automatically cross-checks and couples some data embedded in the piece of
hardware (the car registration number or some codes linked to the cards)
with the data recorded in a data base (of the motor vehicle registry, the banks
or the PKI), and some data provided by the subject to assist their
identification.
In MCOL and TOL, the user provides the credit card numbers or the
PKI password during the identification process. The case of speed cameras
requires more steps. The system of penalty notices assumes that the owner of

HeinOnline -- 20 Griffith L. Rev. 1009 2011

1010 .1

GRIFFITHLA w REVIEW (2011) VOL 20 No 4

the car has incurred the penalty, as ifthey were the holder of any other form
of identification. Yet the owner can at this point enter into the legal ritual of
identification by filing a statutory declaration identifying a different driver.
At this stage, the identification of the driver becomes performative. Even
though the process of identification is first handled in the digital domain, it is
supported by other media (paper) and alternative procedures. Different
tracks are available to reassemble the components required for identification.
Agency is circulated through different domains.
The case studies also demonstrate different mediations between legal
frameworks and technological alternatives that impact on the complexity of
the architecture, on the development process and on the values promoted and
protected by the system. In TOL, the decision to use the PKI infrastructure
and digital signature was considered the best techno-legal solution to
guarantee the identity of the parties. Lawyers and their associations strongly
supported this solution." What was not clear initially was the complexity
that decision introduced into the system architecture and procedures. Indeed,
the information infrastructure required for the PKI was not in place, and
such information infrastructures are not simple, self-contained tools that can
be developed easily. Their development is not controlled by a central
authority, but it has its own rules depending also on the availability of a
critical mass of users, on the presence of companies providing the service
(for lawyers and lawyers associations), on the cost of the services they
provide, and on the willingness of users to buy the services and use them to
exchange data." In simple terms, PKI appeared to the ministry and the
lawyers to be an easy fix - it met high techno-legal standards - but its
deployment has been almost impossible. Not being available and shared by
potential users, being expensive and difficult to develop, it took more than
six years to get a court and its bar ready to use the system. With PKI, digital
access to justice was not just closed to citizens, but was almost impossible
for lawyers too."
On the other hand, the case of MCOL is a story of ICT being used
effectively to increase access to justice. Indeed, MCOL was developed very
quickly (it was online in six months), taking advantage of technological
components - online use of bank cards - that were already in place. The fact
that key components of the information infrastructure were shared by a large
number of potential users is one of the reasons for the fast development and
rapid deployment of MCOL to many users, and its success in the number of
cases processed."6 We can see, therefore, that apparently small differences in
the technologies used may have profound consequences in terms of
complexity, cost and access to technology and to justice alike.
The use of speed cameras and automatically issued infringement notices
in Australia illustrates a converse issue in access to justice. If the Italian
s'
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TOL system was almost impossible to use, the speeding penalty notice is

almost too easy. The user gains access to justice without perhaps recognising
that they have entered into the juridical domain." The appearance of being in
a bill-paying environment masks the presence of the law and of legal
consequences. An owner paying a fine without naming the actual driver
accrues demerit points to their own licence, while feeling that a financial
obligation was discharged. At the same time, the appearance of the billpaying environment may contribute to the widespread public perception that
speed cameras are a revenue-raising device, rather than a road safety or lawenforcement device.

Making Technology Legal
It is clear now that ICT cannot be used to manage and record status changes
(whether in debt or traffic infringement) without an appropriate regulation.
We have, however, identified two distinct approaches. In the first one,
formal (i.e. legal) regulations, drafted by lawyers and enacted by the
parliament, aim to design the internal features of the technology. As in the
Italian case, the legal codes come first, and try to establish the configuration
of the software codes and system architecture. This approach begins from
the formal rules, stating what is legal and what it is not (i.e. which kind of
technology can and cannot be used), as well as how technology should
operate. In this development model, first the technology appears in the
official gazette, then formal prescriptions have to be transformed into
running applications. As has been seen, the consequence in the case of TOL
was a system architecture that was extremely complex, difficult to develop,
inaccessible and very expensive.
By contrast, in the MCOL case the first step was the development of the
technology by the Department and by contracted private companies. This
allowed the developers to assemble a system by taking advantage of the
technologies already available, and to postpone the use of systems (like the
electronic Government Gateway) that were not yet ready. The law
authorising the use of MCOL for handling specific types of claims was only
passed once the system was running. As noted, the law did not prescribe the
technological details of each component of the applications (as in TOL) but
simply legalised the ensemble of technological procedures. Speed camera
legislation also takes this approach. The existing regulation does not
prescribe in detail (or in advance) the technical features of the system, but
rather specifies the main features of the overall system and legalises its use
to measure the speed of a car and identify its driver.
Divergent rules can also originate in those external organisations to
which the courts outsource particular functions. This creates difficulties for
the conceit of law-makers and lawyers that law is the sovereign source of all
regulation. The technology of law cannot simply overturn the rule of
technology. The development of large ICT-based communication systems
5
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has its own autonomous rules." As long as the courts and legislators fail to
recognise that they are operating in a hybrid environment of cross-cutting
regulative regimes, they will continue to be surprised and frustrated by
unintended consequences, public misconceptions and failure to integrate law
and technology.
There is a converse side to this argument that law does not make all the
rules: law does not only make rules. Following a rule always requires
communication between people and their actions which encompass
corporeality and the world of objects." Filing a case in a registry, giving
evidence from a witness box, cross-examining from the bar table, and
recording judgment in a file are the taken-for-granted practices of law that
have grown with it over centuries. They are well inscribed in habitus and
communication protocols, even where the formal rules are silent.
To resolve the difficulties that arise from legal misconceptions that
rules can create technological solutions, one must understand the different
levels of operation of legal and technological regulation. Law creates the
conditions for new social facts: changes of status that are institutionally
constituted. Technology manipulates information and things, 'brute facts'
that enable or block actions and produce physical effects.' Law's role in
designing technological solutions is necessarily very limited. Its more
appropriate role is to legitimate already existing solutions, as in MCOL or
speed cameras. Where law has been used to specify the technological
conditions of particular interactions ex ante, as in the case of the Italian
TOL, it creates unworkable monsters. Not only does the technology
proliferate to the point that it is almost impossible to use; the law proliferates
to the point that it is almost impossible to understand. There is a rule for
every tool, every packet of data, almost every keystroke."
This diagnosis suggests that the answer may lie in finding the correct
order for regulation to take place: if not ex ante, then when? The opposite
solution would be post facto: create the technology and then legitimate it.
This too can create difficulties if the technology was not designed with legal
requirements in mind. Law requires permanent and (to an extent) public
records, unambiguous identification and solemn declarations. Ticking the
box stating 'I have read and understand the terms and conditions', while it is
adequate to authorise downloading a song, an application or a ticket, would
be insufficiently secure and too performatively weak for legal processes that
change our social or civil status. The lawyers need to communicate the
security and performative needs to the technologists, but the solution can
only be a joint effort. When the solution is technologically workable and
legally robust, then the law can authorise it.
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This raises the question of what is it that is authorised. Our research
indicates that when law works with technology, it entangles numerous
actors, techniques and regulations. Judges and court staff, lawyers, software
and hardware providers all interact with the technology and the regulations
(both legal and technical) to reassemble new composites of actors and
techniques. As Lanzara has pointed out, these composites or assemblages
'are based as much upon communications and functional relations as upon
authority and norms': they work through the social circulation of agency in
space and time.62 They determine who is empowered to do what, which
objects authorise, record and transmit agency. If law is to legitimate
effective new techniques it must authorise the composite of people,
regulations, tools and organisations (public and private) that make it work.
Instead of legislating a tool for every rule, legislation must encompass the
functional composite of actors, technologies and practices that make it work.

Pathways and the Reassembling of Agency
We now turn to look at how this entanglement of technology, law and
markets affects the agency required to effect changes of status. As we have
seen in the three case studies, even digital identification is also based on
paper and conventional procedures. This observation can be extended to the
entire process. MCOL, TOL and speed cameras all use records kept in
electronic format as well as in traditional paper files. Notifications to
defendants are made through conventional means (post or bailiff) and only
in residual cases through the web. The final certifications of the change of
status (such as injunctions or orders to pay) are recorded on paper as well as
in digital systems. Far from being paperless, all these procedures
continuously jump between different media: actions take place on paper (as
seen in identification), in digital formats (camera image, data entered into
web forms and documents) and in person, in swearing a declaration or, in
residual cases, in courtrooms. The effective management of changes of
status requires different things, sometimes material (computers, cameras,
cards, number plates, etc) and sometimes immaterial (software codes and
data). Further, it requires a web of relations between the material and the
immaterial (such as the link between ownership of a vehicle and the number
plate). Law regulates or legitimises the overall system, and requires the
proper distribution of agency through different domains: law, technology,
bureaucracy and commerce. Each of these domains tends to regulate agency
and judicial procedures in different ways, introducing different requirements,
incentives and constraints to action. Keeping the three domains assembled in
a way that allows changes of status requires difficult mediations and
courageous legal approaches."
Identifying all the actors and things that go to make legal technology
work highlights another difficulty uncovered by the research. New
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technologies and architectures introduce new actors as well as new ways of
working. The introduction of each new actor (eg the private sector) and
technology (eg a remote server) introduces a potential new source of
instability for the system. The ICT consultants who write the code for the
new protocols and the companies that run the servers have their own
constraints, cultures and communities. As these proliferate, so too do the
risks of breakdown. Those actors and their cultures introduce their own
regulatory regimes. Just as law cannot regulate their every action, nor can it
afford to ignore any. Technological standards allowing the smooth
functioning of ICT systems can be legislated, but if they cannot be
implemented by developers or understood by users they remain just empty
boxes. New instabilities are introduced to the system if the code does not
work or if the server goes down because the company did not pay the
maintenance contractors.
Clearly, these risks can never be eliminated: more complexity
inevitably proliferates risk.' We may, however, propose that the ICT
enabled system be considered as just one of the channels that guarantee
performative efficacy. Digital proceedings cannot eliminate conventional
ones, and it may be better if the 'paperless court' were to stay in the realm of
science fiction. Paper will coexist with the digital, using the strategy of
'smart redundancy'. We have already seen that MCOL retains a two-track
system, both to accommodate the preferences of the parties and to ensure the
availability of the systems. We can also suggest that new ways of
understanding the operations of law and technology can ameliorate the
problem. Again, the answer lies in the level of interactions that are
encompassed by the legal system, which should not focus on authorising and
maintaining a specific tool or rule. Laws and legal and managerial practices
need to define the spheres of responsibility and agency appropriate to the
functional ensemble of actors, rules and things. The unit of analysis, of
legitimation and of accountability must be the reassembled functional
composite, rather than any particular code, actor (eg a company or a judge)
or machine.

Contexts of the Performative
Up to this point of our conclusions, we have been dealing with matters
internal to and of major concern to the legal or judicial system: breakdowns
in the interface between law and technology, challenges to legal forms, and
excessively complex systems that are unworkable even for the professionals
who created them. We now shift focus to the consequences for social reality
outside the legal realm. When a party is identified, a statement is sworn or a
legal determination is made, what impact does this have on the party, the
enunciator or the subject of status change?
We have seen that it matters whether one swears an oath rather than
signs a form or enters a password; whether identification relies on our
64
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swearing on a Bible, whether our log-in details match those of our credit or
debit card, or whether we are identified as the registered owner of a vehicle.
If the law legitimises these procedures, architectures and outcomes, then
they may be considered to have the required legal effect. However, swearing
and entering into an agreed change of status go beyond the letter of the law.
Their implications extend into a wider range of social relations: whether I
lose my licence or become obligated to pay a debt.
In the case of the automatic speeding infringement, we noted the
consequences for the registered owner of paying the fine, of not declaring
that there was some other driver, and the dominance of the 'payment
options' compared with the fine print that warns the owner not to send
payment with a declaration. There is a danger that the owner may treat the
infringement notice as a bill to be paid, rather than a legal notice. That is
certainly the simplest way to deal with a letter that looks like a bill and
informs us of a financial obligation. The options for payment, beginning
from the option to pay online using BPay (an online bill-paying protocol
common to all Australian banks and utilities firms) are easy. Indeed, as we
noted above, they are 'almost too easy', to quote from a ubiquitous
advertisement for BPay.
If processes are adopted that are familiar from other social interactions
- invitations to pay online, entering user names and passwords - then the
source of authority and legal consequences may not be accurately signalled
to the participants. Even though the signals may be there (and they are, in
legal terms) the participants may misread the signals. The assignment of
status change may appear to be less formal, less binding or with fewer longterm consequences than in the traditional courtroom setting.
We have pointed out that old rules inscribed into new tools can change
their effect. The technology is not a neutral medium which conducts
whatever is introduced at one end, spitting it out, unchanged, at the other.
Latour gives the example of trying to fax a pizza: the technology just won't
do it." Where the automatic process server identifies the offending vehicle,
mails the notice to the registered owner, and treats the fine as if it were a
simple financial obligation, the element of having committed an offence is
obscured. The car was correctly identified and the obligation discharged by
electronic payment. But it does not end there: in paying the fine, an offence
is admitted. The further implications include loss of points, with eventual
loss of licence for successive offences. The technology of online bill
payment does not signal the legal change of status to 'offender' in the same
way a court trial does.
Drawing attention to the full technological, architectural and
institutional context of the process raises a practical question for the parties.
If they are excluded from or fail to recognise the context of their
65

'To wish to convey understanding (connaissance)through the channels of law amounts to
trying to fax a pizza- it won't help to increase the power of the modem, it is quite simply
not the right medium. Law, like religion, like politics, would be deceiving itself if it
wanted to convey information.' Latour (2002), p 288.

HeinOnline -- 20 Griffith L. Rev. 1015 2011

1016

GRIFFITH LA w REVIEW (2011) VOL 20 No 4

undertakings, then there is the danger of a new type of performative failure.
Austin refers to 'misfires', where the ship remains unnamed or the baby
unbaptised, because of a failure of authority (eg the official was not
authorised to launch the ship or to baptise babies). But the sort of failures to
which we draw attention here can occur when the authority is formally in
place, but the participants do not recognise the context. In this case, the
performative 'fires' alright, but with consequences that may not have been
recognised by the enunciator. This may be called 'friendly fire' - an apposite
term since the phenomenon is often associated with efforts to make legal and
judicial processes 'user-friendly', on the model of ICT. If the context of a
legal commitment appears to be one of online bill paying, is this not equally
conducive to the failure of efficacy of the performative? In these cases, the
performative has been expressed within a structure of rules, but in a new
context. The rules have been inscribed into a divergent technology,
institutional architecture or social context.
The Italian TOL tries obsessively to ensure that there can be no doubt
as to the identity of the parties, through ever more sophisticated hardware
and software. It treats the technological requirements as a legal question of
certainty in identification. But perhaps the question is not just how to secure
the identification, but rather whether an online procedure fulfils the
performative requirements of context.
Limiting the focus on technology to its formal legality or its technical
efficacy fails to appreciate the important semiotic baggage that is carried by
the context (including the technology itself). Agamben, following L6viStrauss, has pointed to the excessive signification in the esoteric rituals of
the oath. He proposes that it is this very excess that carries with it the power
to make changes to the social world.' The performative utterance cannot be
reduced to its correspondence to the signified." In order to be legally
identified, we are bound to our words; our good faith is guaranteed on pain
of perjury. The oath or the signature, as performative, binds the speaker to
their statement, the person to the deed.
Social power and legal efficacy always go beyond the note in the file or
the entry to the database. Those are necessary but hardly sufficient
conditions to register a change of status, whether to debtor or offender. The
change of status must be recognised, not just by the law but by the
community, including the parties to an action. Any interaction between law,
technology and society can only be understood as an assemblage of
regulation, legitimation and the way in which people use and understand the
things placed a their disposal. To the familiar categories of law's deontology
and technology's teleology must be added the social efficacy of the
performative. The interfaces of law and technology rely on the interpretive
context in which messages are understood as well as the legal forms in
which they are transmitted. Each of these elements is essential to the
6

67

Agamben (2011), p 68.
Supporting this assertion, Foucault points out that the performative enonc isan event that
cannot be exhausted by either language (langue) or meaning. Foucault (1969), p 40.
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circulation of agency between people and things that constitutes and
reassembles legal and social relationships.
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